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SHOULD CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS
BECOME CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS?
A REPLY TO WILLIAM HASKER
James A. Keller

This paper continues a debate about the relation between Christian philosophers and theologians begun by Gordon Kaufman, who argued that Christian
theologians need not be interested in "evidentialism." In particular it replies
to a paper by William Hasker charging that an earlier defense of Kaufman's
position introduced tensions because it required judgments about the merits
of "evidentialism" which could be defended only by using the evidentialist
arguments whose importance Kaufman denied. This reply denies that there
are the tensions Hasker claims and argues that the judgments need not rest
on a detailed assessment of evidentialist arguments.
The pages of this journal have seen a series of articles on the relationship
between Christian philosophers and theologians. The series began with an
article by Gordon Kaufman explaining why (some) Christian theologians are
not interested in what he called "evidentialism."l Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann collaborated on a reply.2 I responded to their article as a
whole and Paull. Griffiths responded to one point in it. 3 William Hasker has
answered my reply.4 This note is a reply to Hasker. 5
The question between Kaufman (and me), on the one hand, and Stump and
Kretzmann (and Hasker), on the other, is whether Christian theologians
should be interested in certain issues, which Kaufman characterizes as part
of evidentialism. (In light of the fact that he was writing for philosophers, I
think that this was not the best term he might have chosen, as I shall explain
later.) And as Hasker notes, in my reply I did not claim simply that Kaufman
was not interested in such issues. Rather, I claimed that it is rational for him
not to be interested in these issues, or more modestly, that it was not irrational
for him not to be interested in them. 6 Hasker concedes that I met some of
Stump and Kretzmann's criticisms, but he claims that my defense (including
my suggested interpretations and modifications of Kaufman) "reveals and/or
introduces some deep tensions in the position" (p. 273). He goes on to discuss
three tensions in Kaufman's position as modified by me, which I shall term
the "KK view.,,7
I think the central feature in all the alleged tensions is this: the KK view
which I created in defending Kaufman involves assertions about the justifiedFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 12 No.2 April 1995
All rights reserved

260

A REPLY TO WILLIAM HASKER

261

ness of beliefs (or assertions) about God, but this justifiedness cannot be
assessed apart from precisely those evidentialist considerations in which
Kaufman has expressed no interest. This is an important challenge to the KK
view; to answer it, I will have to develop the view further.
In my earlier response I assumed, without explicitly saying so, a kind of
soft perspectivalism. It is a perspectivalism in that I believe that each thinker
sees the world from within a set of assumptions, categories, beliefs, etc. A
thinker evaluates evidence, decides what constitutes a good reason, decides
what issues are worth investigating, etc. from within his or her own perspec~
tive. My view is a soft perspectivalism in that I think that these categories,
assumptions, etc. can be rationally adjudicated. However, I further think that
rational adjudication of basic aspects of a person's perspective is very difficult. (I suspect that Kaufman is a perspectivalist, though I do not know
whether he is a soft or a hard perspectivalist [a person who believes that
rational adjudication of perspectives is impossible].)8 As a soft perspectivalist, I believe that when all truths are known, it will be known which is the
correct perspective, but those of us alive now will probably not live that long.
In the meantime, what shall we do? Is a thinker irrational if she does not
want to spend any (more) time considering whether another perspective is
the correct one or considering issues which are important only from within
a different perspective? I do not think so. Each of us has only so much time,
and we devote it to activities which seem most promising and most worthwhile. But they seem that way to each of us from his own perspective. That
perspective is rationally adjudicable, but we may have better things to do
than adjudicate the perspective; for example, we may want to refine the
perspective (as Stump and Kretzmann, e.g., have so ably done on some issues
in Thomistic theism).
So I would say that it is not irrational for Kaufman, given his perspective,
to investigate what he does and to ignore what Stump, Kretzmann, and likeminded Christian philosophers do. I would also say that it is not irrational
for them to do what they do and to ignore Kaufman. Note that Stump and
Kretzmann do not explain why they do not investigate the issues which
concern Kaufman (e.g., the involvement of Christians in great evils). It might
also be rational for either party to explore the perspective of the other and to
try to adjudicate the issues between them, but it is not irrational for them not
to do so. After all, they have only so much time and energy. That is why from
Kaufman's perspective (but presumably not from Stump's) there are questions
which demand a rather different approach. 9
The foregoing puts in broader perspective my defense of the rationality of
Kaufman's not investigating in detail the arguments of the evidentialists. But
does that defense commit the KK view to claims about the value of evidentialist arguments which could be defended only by the sort of detailed analysis
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of those arguments which the KK view implies that Christian theologians
may properly omit? That it does make such a commitment is the nub of
Hasker's charge, as we can see by looking at the three points he makes.
1. According to Hasker, the KK view is committed to saying both that
evidential ism is unimportant and uninteresting and that traditional Christian
beliefs are lacking in support. The first part of this point, though perhaps
stated too strongly, is at least roughly the point we were both making. lO As
for the second half of the point, both Kaufman and I did say things which
might be taken to support it; for example, as Hasker notes, I distinguished
"matters on which we are more justified in being confident from those on
which we are less justified" (my p. 73). However, whether it does support
Hasker's point depends on the basis on which the distinction is made. I think
Hasker assumes that it could be made only on the basis of a careful analysis
of the arguments. But Kaufman could make it on the basis of the degree of
consensus achieved among those who have studied the arguments. It is beyond dispute that there is as yet no consensus among all (or even almost all)
interested parties about which arguments establish knowledge-claims about
God. This situation provides a basis for the KK view to hold that claims about
God are matters on which we are not justified in being very confident. Of
course, the KK view may be wrong about this: there may be unnoticed or
unappreciated arguments which establish to a very high degree the truth of
certain knowledge-claims about God. But surely it is not irrational to think
this is unlikely. Nor is it irrational for Kaufman to think that in light of this
fact about the status of arguments about God, as a Christian theologian he
has better uses for his time than to investigate these arguments.
Of course, it is fully compatible with this position to admit that from a
different perspective some knowledge-claims about God seem better justified
than do others. It is also compatible to admit that some people might be
justified, at least from their perspective, in devoting their attention to arguments about these knowledge-claims. The KK view is not committed to
claiming that no one should investigate these arguments; it is committed only
to claiming that those who do accept its perspective are not irrational in
devoting their attention to other matters.
Does this mean Kaufman and I reject all evidence? I do not. And if Kaufman proposes this, I cannot agree with him. But I do not think that one should
conclude from his rejection of evidential ism that he rejects evidence, for I
do not think he is using "evidential ism" in a very precise way. I think he uses
it as a term for a position which has a concern for the kinds of issues, and
uses the philosophical methodology, typical of people like Plantinga, Alston,
Stump, Kretzmann, etc. (Thus I think that Kaufman would call Plantinga an
evidentialist in the loose sense in which [I think] he uses that term.) But I
also think that Kaufman makes arguments, appeals to evidence, gives reasons,
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etc. However, they are different kinds of reasons and evidence, and they
involve different sorts of issues, from those which concern Stump,
Kretzmann, etc. So Kaufman would not regard what he does as exemplifying
evidentialism. ll As Hasker notes (p. 274), Kaufman is not interested in epistemological discussions. But he does give evidence for some claims. And his
can be a consistent position if one admits that it is rational for people not to
explore issues which do not seem worthwhile from their perspective. (Of
course, Kaufman has to be concerned about what constitutes a good reason,
but he can explore that topic in relation to issues which concern him; he does
not have to explore it in relation to issues which concern relatively orthodox
Christian philosophers.)
2. According to Hasker, the KK view says that "our ways of conceiving
God and Christ are heavily determined by culturally-conditioned traditions,
concepts, and worldviews," but we are free to modify or reject the traditions
we have received. Despite what Hasker says, these two claims are not inconsistent or even in tension. The KK view is that we are strongly influenced by
our traditions, not that we are completely determined by them. However, it
is very difficult to modify a tradition by which one lives; it typically takes
considerable thought and experience to come to the point where a different
tradition makes more sense of one's life than an earlier one by which one
lived.
Moreover, (what I take to be) the fact that our claims are all culturally
conditioned need not imply that those who believe them have no good reason
to do so and hold them only because they were taught them as they grew up.
It would imply this only if there were no reasons offered for those beliefs
within that perspective. But typically this is not so. (Most of us first came to
believe certain geometrical truths because we were taught them, yet we may
think that we were also taught quite good reasons for holding them. And
debates within the philosophy of religion are usually marked by careful and
sophisticated argument for the key claims.) But whether some person who
holds some belief as part of perspective A has better reasons to hold it than
does another person who holds a contradictory belief as part of perspective
B is usually a very difficult question. On fundamental matters it cannot be
answered without deciding which perspective is more nearly correct. As a
soft perspectivalist, I believe that in principle this can be done. But I also
admit that in practice often it cannot be done: despite prolonged good-faith
efforts on both sides no agreement is reached. Someone who is aware of this
practical difficulty may well think that it is more worthwhile for her to
explore and refine her own perspective rather than to explore some other
perspective or to try to determine which is the correct perspective. Simply
because she chooses not to explore some other perspective, she need not be
irrational nor lacking in reasons which support her beliefs. 12
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3. The third tension Hasker finds in the KK view is that it accepts the claim
that "we know in reality almost nothing about God and Christ, but we can be
confident in our experiential knowledge of sin and salvation" (p. 275). One
part of Hasker's criticism here may be right. I tried to justify a difference in
confidence levels by saying that the charge that something is a sin can be
based on our experience of a rupture of our relationship to God while our
concepts of God and Christ are not so experientially based. Hasker replied
that some of the things Kaufman says are sins go beyond this: e.g., Kaufman's
statement· that the attempt to control God by claiming to have conclusive
evidences or arguments about God is sin. I agree that this statement does
appear to go beyond what is experientially based. But it may be simply a
strong way of saying that doing this often leads to evil actions toward those
who do not accept the beliefs about God which the evidences or arguments
allegedly support-i.e., that it is a sin because it predisposes to evil actions.
However, I agree that evil actions are not the inevitable consequence of
thinking one has conclusive evidences or arguments about God. 13
Hasker continues his development of the third tension by claiming that the
KK view requires the assumption "that there is some generic experience of
a 'God-relationship' or 'salvation' which is substantially identical across all
religions, though it gets described differently depending on the various conceptual systems espoused by different faiths" (p. 275). Hasker's point here
seems correct at least to this extent: the KK view does imply that people who
have different perspectives can use a word like salvation without being gUilty
of sheer equivocation. I4 I think people can do this. I think the various uses
have in common some sort of feeling of "rightness" or "wholeness" in one's
existence-i.e., they have an experiential component if not a nonexperiential
component at least partly in common. I5 (The quoted terms are, of course,
also vague, and one can ask whether there is one generic concept for them.)
But what one understands to be "wrong" which the rightness replaces differs
from religion to religion, and it differs (though typically to a lesser degree)
within each religion. And the concrete experiences are not identical; for one
thing, a different understanding makes the total experience different, for the
understanding affects the experience. Despite these factors, I still think there
can be some overlap in meaning for the term "salvation" as it occurs in
different perspectives.
Christians understand the salvation they experience to be something involving their relation to a reality they name "God." If "salvation" is understood
to involve this relation, then when Kaufman experiences salvation (i.e.,
roughly rightness or wholeness in his life), he will speak of being rightly
related to God, though he may not be very confident about what this God is
like to whom he is related, for he may not think the experience (or anything
else) enables him to learn much about God. Or his diffidence in claiming to
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know much about God or Christ might be the result of his awareness of the
differences among those who call themselves Christian. He might be reasoning something like this: "If so many different people can so differently conceptualize this reality, and if it makes sense from the perspective of each to
conceptualize the reality as he or she does, then 1 should not be very confident
about my way of conceptualizing that reality even though it does (or may)
make good sense from my perspective.,,16
Certainly Hasker is right that conceptions of how our relationship with God
may be restored and the experiences of that restoration differ greatly between
(theistic) religions and (I would add) between different sects of the same
religion. (And some religions have a conception of salvation which does not
involve any relation to a god.) 1 also agree with (what I take to be) his implicit
conclusion that not all these conceptions can be correct. However, I would
hold that even if someone has a conception of salvation which is largely
incorrect, the person might nevertheless live a life which involves a generally
increasing experience of rightness or wholeness. That is, I hold that a partially
incorrect conception of what salvation involves need not preclude a genuinely
saving experience, particularly if we understand ~as I do) salvation not as an
either-or condition but as admitting of degrees. 1 A partially incorrect conception may mediate a transformation which is experienced as genuinely
healing. Later one may (or may not) come to regard that experience as itself
only partial or initiatory, but I do not see how any human can be certain of
having an experience of rightness and wholeness so complete that no improvement is possible; therefore, no one can be certain on the basis of his
experience that the salvation he experiences is not just partial or initiatory.
However, if one is living a life which is satisfactory on this dimension and
it has a certain perspective on God etc. as part of it, then it is not irrational
for one not to enter into discussions with others who function out of a somewhat (or very) different perspective.
This is not to say that the truth about whose conception of salvation contains the most nearly correct account of what is wrong with human life and
how it can be remedied is uninteresting, but only that other matters may be
more interesting and more important. If a Christian theologian finds (within
his perspective, for where else can he operate?) that it is more important to
focus on how people live as Christians rather than to join certain philosophers
in analyzing the nature of salvation implicit in Anselm's account of the
atonement, is he necessarily irrational to do so? It may be replied that analyzing these matters or puzzling out the nature of God contributes to living
Christian lives or to worshipping God more fervently. Perhaps for many
people it does, but would it have that result for everyone? More to the point,
would giving attention to such issues always (or even usually) contribute
more to the living of Christian lives than would investigating the issues which
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concern Kaufman? It may contribute, but so may other activities and concerns. Of course, theologians may not help much either. But if what Christian
philosophers do is not demonstrably more effective for everyone than alternative activities would be, then it is not irrational for theologians, who are
qua theologians concerned about promoting Christian living, not to enter into
the discussions of Christian philosophers.
One final note: I mean this reply to be irenic though I defended the KK
view. My basic point is simply that it is not irrational for Kaufman to pursue
the issues he pursues rather than those which Christian philosophers pursue.
In defending the KK view against Hasker, I assumed that Kaufman might
base judgments about the value of (what he calls) evidentialist arguments on
their failure to generate a consensus among those who studied them rather
than on a detailed assessment of the arguments. But neither in my original
paper nor in this one did I intend to suggest or imply that Stump and
Kretzmann are irrational in pursuing the issues which they pursue. IS In both
cases, that the scholars are not irrational is dependent on other beliefs which
they hold, beliefs which may be false. But there are many other beliefs each
holds which may be false and many other theories each holds which merit
further elucidation. In each case the failure to investigate the truth of a select
set of the scholar's beliefs cannot ipso facto be evidence of irrationality.
Because of important differences in their beliefs, I think it likely that they

will continue to find very different issues worth investigating. I9
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6. Hasker overstates my aim when he says (p. 273 that I was trying to show that the
preferences of the theologian were more rational than those of the Christian philosopher.
I was not making any sort of comparison.
7. In this reply I will try to s how that Hasker has not identified any serious tensions in
the KK view. However, even if I should fail, that would indicate only that the KK view
should be modified or abandoned; it would not by itself indicate that Kaufman should be
interested in Stump and Kretzmann's methods and issues.
8. Kaufman does not present his position as simply his perspective, but few thinkers do
in their initial presentations. They present (what they take to be) the truth. When they are
criticized and discover that their opponents do not accept certain important premises, they
can either try to defend those premises or simply explain that this is their perspective. In
defending Kaufman I took the latter approach since I think that he would not want to
debate all the issues needed to resolve the controversy (and I am not sure that Stump and
Kretzmann would either; I would not want to).
9. Hasker cites a statement of Kaufman's to this effect in his note 5.
10. I say it is perhaps too strong, for Kaufman argued that there were other issues which
were more interesting and more important to Christian theologians. And I attempted to
defend that judgment. But to say that X is more interesting or important than Y is not to
say or to imply that Y is uninteresting or unimportant.
II. My reason for this analysis of what Kaufman means by evidentialism is that it is
the only way I can consistently combine what he says about evidentialism and what he
does.
12. In his note 7 Hasker acknowledges that the pluralism of traditions generates so great
a variety of ways of conceiving God that we may be unable to choose among them. He
correctly points out that Christian philosophers have given considerable effort to considering and evaluating different conceptions of God. However, Kaufman might reply that
these efforts have not yet yielded anything like a consensus and that he prefers to consider
other issues rather than joining in a debate which seems to him unlikely to yield any result
which is generally agreed to be correct. Moreover, he may think that other topics of study
would yield results which contribute more to the living of a Christian life. (I claimed in
my earlier paper that Christian theologians were more concerned qua theologians with
this issue than were Christian philosophers qua Christian philosophers.)
13. Note, however, that Kaufman does not say that it is the conviction that one has
conclusive evidences or arguments about God which is the sin; he says it is the attempt
to control God through conclusive evidences or arguments. It is not clear whether he thinks
that the conviction that one has conclusive evidences or arguments inevitably leads to the
attempt to control God.
14. In this discussion I prefer the term "salvation" because the term "God-relationship"
presupposes the correctness of some sort of theism. If theists are correct, salvation does
involve a God-relationship. But a conclusion on this matter need not be built into our
terminology.
15. Conceptions of salvation differ in the stress they put on the experiential component
compared to the nonexperiential component. Orthodox Protestant conceptions typically
place primary emphasis on the nonexperiential component: salvation is a transaction
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between God and the sinner; whether we feel saved or not is secondary. Other conceptions
(including mine and, I suspect, Kaufman's) place more emphasis on the experiential
component. Thus any similarity in the experiential component of what two people refer
to as salvation is more significant for me than (1 think) it would be for Hasker in showing
that the term is not used equivocally.
16. Kaufman's diffidence may also have a practical motivation: great sins have been
committed and great intolerance practiced in the name of God by those who claimed such
knowledge. (Admittedly, the connection is psychological, not logical, but it has been
common in Christianity.) Such confidence was a background condition for the Inquisition
and for burning heretics at the stake. It contributed to the persecution of the Jews. (Liberals
have been guilty of great sins, but not of the sin of coercing others to make them accept
their ideas about God.) Kaufman may think that an effective way to lessen religiously
based persecution is to get people to think that their conceptions of God and Christ are
not well-grounded. And he may think that the confidence that one has conclusive evidence
and arguments about God will contribute to intolerance toward others and in this way to
a sin against God. He may also fear that it will result in one's not being open to new
insights about God that would contradict one's present ideas; after all, if one has conclusive arguments, anything contrary to them would have been an error.
17. Of course, that salvation is a matter of degrees is also controversial; it is part of my
perspective but not part of everyone else's. Here is another matter which one could
investigate, but am I irrational if I choose to investigate other matters rather than it?
18. Indeed, as a Christian philosopher I find myself more interested in many of the
issues which concern Stump and Kretzmann than in those which concern Kaufman. Thus,
though I defend the rationality of Kaufman's not pursuing Stump and Kretzmann 's issues,
I do not think the KK view forbids pursuing those issues. Which issues seem worth
pursuing depends on many factors.
19. Bill Hasker generously commented on an earlier draft of this paper. I wish to thank
him for his comments, which helped this paper focus on the issues between us and avoid
some irrelevancies and misunderstandings.

